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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING FEDERAL COURTS:
FROM BOTTOM LINE TO MYSTERY

LAURA E. LITTLE*

INTRODUCTION
Federal Courts sounds dry. It isn’t. The subject controls some of the most
compelling issues of our time; the War on Terror,1 the Terri Schiavo
litigation,2 and the presidential election of 20003 are just a few of the
controversies that have turned on Federal Courts issues. In just the last four
years, the standing doctrine alone has spawned decisions impacting such hotbutton issues as greenhouse gas emissions,4 corporate tax breaks,5 school
desegregation,6 election financing,7 faith-based initiatives,8 and a school
child’s freedom to decline to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.9 Federal Courts
cases acquaint students with a large portion of the Constitution, introduce
profound debates about the optimum structure of government, and offer
practical knowledge about federal litigation. Yielding even larger lessons
beyond its doctrinal limits, the course renders students expert in the structure
of Supreme Court opinions and initiates students in rhetorical and linguistic

* Professor of Law and James E. Beasley Chair in Law, Temple University’s Beasley School of
Law. Copyright 2009 held by Laura E. Little. I am grateful to my colleague, Sophie Smyth, and
my research assistant, Alice Ko, for their help on this project.
1. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
2. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).
3. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
4. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
5. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
6. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
7. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
8. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). The Roberts Court
has in fact issued many more standing opinions, but not all may be fairly characterized as
implicating “hot buttons.” See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. __,
128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008) (dispute concerning payphones).
9. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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devices useful where human interaction calls for subtlety (and perhaps even
obfuscation).10
Despite these compelling reasons for taking Federal Courts,11 many
students run from the subject. In teaching the course, I have experimented
with remedies to counteract this tendency to flee. Now, after more than a few
years teaching Federal Courts, I have several reliable antidotes, which divide
roughly into five categories: (1) bottom-line practicality; (2) current events; (3)
storytelling; (4) taxonomy; and (5) mystery. The antidotes, which reflect
progressively expanding levels of abstraction, make the course less scary and
more appealing. My real design though is to harness the antidotes as vehicles
to transport students to a sophisticated level of learning and understanding.
I. BOTTOM-LINE PRACTICALITY
The enormous complexity and subtle abstraction of Federal Courts
doctrine inspires much student concern. Students can become disoriented as
they miss the big picture (the proverbial forest) while entangled in the doctrine
(the proverbial trees). One principle, however, offers steadfast support through
the thicket of doctrinal details: all Federal Courts cases, at bottom, concern
whether a case can stay in federal court. While a case may present a host of
seemingly obscure legal issues, a bottom line question provides focus: can the
federal court get to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim? To reinforce this
concept, I often supplement discussion with a graphical timeline to illustrate
strands of doctrine or events in specific cases. The skeleton of this line starts
on the far left with a point representing the beginnings of a case or controversy,
a middle point represents filing a complaint in a United States district court,
and a far right point designates ultimate review in the United States Supreme
Court.12
Case or
United States
controversy district court
begins
complaint filed

United States Supreme
Court review

Litigation Timeline
10. For ideas on how to illustrate linguistic devices used in Federal Courts opinions, see
Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions,
46 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1998) (surveying use of passive voice, nominalization, subject
complements, role reversal, relexicalization, verb form, and tropes in holdings of federal
jurisdiction cases). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism
Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 961 (1997) (observing how the Supreme Court decided
1990s federalism decisions in a “highly formalistic” manner by reasoning deductively “from
largely unjustified major premises to conclusions”).
11. And I haven’t even mentioned the presence of Federal Courts issues in nearly one-third
of the multi-state bar examination questions on constitutional law.
12. For a more elaborate timeline, illustrating the intricacies of the Younger doctrine, see
LAURA E. LITTLE, FEDERAL COURTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 199 (2007).
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A corollary principle explains parties’ incentives: the plaintiff generally
wants the case in federal court and the defendant generally wants the case out
of federal court.13 Drawing students’ attention to these incentives provides the
opportunity to frame discussion in light of litigation strategy. One can, for
example, discuss the structure of the original suit in New York Times v.
Sullivan,14 explaining how the plaintiff may have joined defendants from his
home state in order to defeat complete diversity and pointing out how the
Mottley15 rule hogtied the defendant New York Times, preventing it from
raising its First Amendment defense first in federal, rather than state, court.
This focus on parties’ strategic behavior not only injects larger context to fine
threads of doctrine, but can dramatize material that does not always hold
uninterrupted interest for the uninitiated.16
Concentrating on the bottom line serves as a pedagogical anchor for
students and showcases an important policy issue pertaining to court access.
By evaluating whether a Federal Courts opinion allows a specific class of
plaintiffs to stay in federal court, students can see how a topic seemingly
divorced from subject matter jurisdiction—such as complete preemption17 or
pleading requirements18—directly controls whether certain plaintiffs have
federal court access.
II. CURRENT EVENTS
People love an inside story and an expert understanding of a particular
subject matter. Consistent with these inclinations, students respond well to
discovering a news item that implicates their learning.19 The news story

13. The obvious exception, of course, being cases presented in the posture of a removal
petition.
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). An excellent source of background drama for this case is
ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
15. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
16. George Rutherglen also advocates focus on parties’ strategic motivation in litigation as a
means to add interest to a course in Civil Procedure. See George Rutherglen, Teaching Civil
Procedure: Past and Prologue, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 13, 15–20 (2003).
17. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (complete
preemption creates federal question jurisdiction in case concerning usury claim against national
bank); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 399 (1987) (complete preemption creates
federal question jurisdiction where plaintiff seeks to enforce claim under collective bargaining
agreement).
18. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading requirements in
Sherman Act antitrust case); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (pleading requirements in § 1983 suits).
19. Although little research on the use of current events in legal education is available,
studies in educational fields show the utility of news articles in the classroom. See, e.g., Kathleen
Cornely, Content and Conflict: The Use of Current Events to Teach Content in a Biochemistry
Course, 31 BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY EDUC. 173, 175 (2003) (discussing the use
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illustrates a concrete setting in which to view abstract principles learned in the
classroom and delivers an “in the know” feeling that validates the hard work
that went into mastering those abstract principles. Students both appreciate
seeing how the doctrine plays out in real life and enjoy special insight about
how legal principles animate the forces at work in the news story. I do not
leave to chance the possibility that students actually discover news stories;
instead I distribute electronic or hard copy versions of stories I encounter
myself. And, of course, Federal Courts jurisprudence is full of news pegs. In
addition to civil rights and military tribunal issues, preemption issues have
most recently posed a particularly strong presence in headlines.20
Interest and understanding also expand when students appreciate how
technical “procedural” rules might control whether courts recognize and
develop constitutional principles at the center of public debate. For example, a
topic as seemingly dry and obscure as the Eleventh Amendment is crucial to
whether federal courts recognize and enforce federal civil rights against state
government incursion. Highlighting this observation, I introduce the Eleventh
Amendment materials by observing that, if the Supreme Court had indulged
suggestions to read the Amendment’s language broadly, the public would
never have seen the likes of Roe v. Wade,21 Goldberg v. Kelly,22 Brown v.
Board of Education,23 or Lawrence v. Texas.24 Likewise, students light up
upon learning how a rule as apparently legalistic as Teague v. Lane’s25
retroactivity principle can dramatically retard the development of
constitutional protections for the criminally accused.
of case studies based on current events as an effective method of teaching biochemical principles
and heightening student interest in the topic); Michael J. O’Sullivan, Teaching Undergraduate
Community Psychology: Integrating the Classroom and the Surrounding Community, 20
TEACHING OF PSYCHOL. 80, 82 (1993) (reporting that students credited current events discussion
with enhancing learning of community psychology concepts).
20. The connection between federal preemption and personal injury actions has recently
garnered preemption issues a place on the front page. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Drug Label,
Maimed Patient and Crucial Test for Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1 (discussing
products liability preemption issues in the Supreme Court, October Term 2008). Perhaps more
surprising to students, however, is the interplay among preemption issues, ideology, and court
power in the context of business matters. For interesting sources on the connection between
business and preemption see David G. Savage, Trumping the States—Business Is Finding Success
in Federal Pre–emption Cases, A.B.A. J., May 2008, at 26 (describing pro-business benefits of
United States Supreme Court’s pro-business jurisprudence); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc.,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38 (reviewing the exceptionally pro–business orientation of
the recent Supreme Court cases). For a sampling of civil rights and other headline–catching
Federal Courts issues see supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
25. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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Through understanding the implications of Federal Courts decisions in the
daily lives of regular people, students learn the “dark underbelly” of procedural
rules. Some react more cynically than others to the notion that decision
makers might conceal the impact of legal principles within a shroud of
jurisdictional rules. Nonetheless, all students benefit from knowing that their
work with the complex doctrines enables them to hone their expertise on the
wheels of power, including mechanisms by which a decision maker might
manipulate the legal system to elude the attention of the press and public. This
access to insiders’ law—one hopes—contributes to students’ sense of calling
and role morality. Students may start to appreciate the importance of lawyers
acting as ambassadors, translators, and opinion leaders in a world of principles
impermeable to the uninitiated.
III. STORYTELLING
My invocation of ordinary people with ordinary problems is not confined
to real news items or social ills that capture headlines. I also travel into the
realm of imagination to develop stories exposing how rules affect citizens who
are experiencing pain or hardship. While arguably trite if presented for
fiction’s sake alone, the stories give contour to the legal discussion and provide
grounding for students as they grapple with the specifics of the rules. For
example, I begin what is perhaps the most technical and confusing unit in a
Federal Courts course—habeas corpus—by asking students to imagine two
competing narratives: (1) the plight of an innocent defendant who was
railroaded by overzealous prosecutors and judges running for reelection and
(2) the emotions of a homicide victim’s relative toward a convicted defendant
who has successfully convinced a habeas court to order a new trial.
Similarly, I create for each unit at least one hypothetical problem designed
with several goals in mind. First, students should enjoy a feeling of mastery
after evaluating possible resolutions of the problem. Second, the problem’s
facts should expose ambiguities or “soft spots” in the legal doctrine. In this
way, students not only learn to identify the law’s deficiencies and to tolerate
lack of certainty, but they also practice making arguments on many sides of a
legal question. The problem should provide an opportunity for characterizing
facts so as to support competing points of view on the law. If possible, the
problem should demonstrate how unexpected consequences unfold when a
legal rule developed in one context is applied in another. From this exercise,
students see how doctrines can play out in litigation, reinforce their knowledge
of legal rules and the dynamics of common law development, and practice
rhetorical skills.
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IV. TAXONOMY
Some Federal Courts students take comfort in the concrete qualities and
narrative aspects of hypothetical problems and current events. Others are more
attracted to the work of categorizing cases and doctrines. Those who enjoy the
academic side of law school are often predisposed to this latter approach to
processing new information. What law professor among us has not been
teased for our analytical tendencies to sort and classify all that life hands us!
The process of creating taxonomies and categorizing data is a crucial
pedagogical tool26—particularly for those who are inclined to use their
brainpower in such ways. In modeling (and indeed endorsing) this way of
learning the material, I focus first on governmental theory. Specifically, I
work with the class in identifying whether opinions express a view on the best
department of government for handling the legal problem presented: State or
federal governments? Executive, legislative, or judicial branches? In the
process of discerning these preferences, students must focus on such matters as
the constitutional language cited, implicit or explicit assumptions about parity
between state and federal courts, and ideologies reflected about which
department of government is most capable of handling a particular legal
problem while simultaneously preserving liberty.
The work of identifying assumptions about governmental values affords an
opportunity for students to get the cases into their heads, to dissect reasoning,
and to appreciate how governmental values color and affect the disposition of
Federal Courts cases. In addition to providing this opportunity for students to
identify governmental values at play in the case law, I introduce a number of
jurisprudential concepts that they can practice using to sort the cases, such as
formalism, functionalism, pragmatism, legal process, and legal realism.
I hold fast to one caveat: understanding diminishes if students hold too fast
to categories and classifications. For deep appreciation, students need to
understand the dangers of creating an immutable grid for organizing the
essence of case law. They benefit from learning to tolerate (and maybe even to
celebrate) ambiguity and appreciating that many cases fail to fit perfectly into a
particular paradigm.27 The cases are complex and likely filled with
contradiction.

26. See Thomas J. Shuell, Phases of Meaningful Learning, 60 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 531,
541–43 (1990) (outlining the process of attaining deeper learning through categorization of
information into preexisting schemata and refinement of these schemata through application to
specific cases).
27. Learning theorist Thomas Shuell explains that in the intermediate phase of learning,
students form new “schemata” or matrices that provide them with greater ability to conceptualize
at high levels of abstraction. Id. at 542. Shuell makes clear, however, that these “new structures
and schemata do not yet allow the learner to function in a fully autonomous, or automatic, basis.”
Id. I maintain that a critical understanding of the limits of schemata is crucial to the goal of

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

FROM BOTTOM LINE TO MYSTERY

803

The dangers of essentializing case law are evident in all legal contexts,
particularly those governed by common law, with its erratic development and
dependence on the specifics of parties’ disputes and litigation strategies.
Several factors enhance these dangers for Federal Courts opinions. First, since
Federal Courts decisions concern largely abstract phenomena divorced from
boundaries in physical reality, courts enjoy more latitude in creating
indeterminate and mutable doctrine in that area. In related fashion, as explored
below, Federal Courts decisions seem to reflect complex unstated agendas.28
For these reasons, a student’s characterization of a decision may belie the
decision writer’s intended effect or the intention discerned by another reader.
Moreover, the subject matter of Federal Courts—court power—is not one that
lends itself to candor and to clarity, since the agents writing—United States
Supreme Court Justices29—often stand to benefit directly from the opinion.30
Similarly, the institutional context of federal jurisdiction decisions may
counsel the Justices to avoid “flashpoints” or “landmines” that spark the
attention of other interested entities (such as administrative agencies, other
courts, and Congress), inspiring those entities to look for ways to circumvent
the decision’s force.31 In light of these factors, I counsel students to be
cautious in becoming wedded to their own characterizations of decisions. One
student’s classification of the decision may belie the Justices’ intended effect
for the decision or vary dramatically with another reader’s rational
interpretation of its words.
To sensitize students to the dangers of trying to distill an immutable
essence from the Federal Courts opinions, I ask students to identify possible
paradoxes or contradictions in the opinion writers’ positions. I might ask, for
example, why Justice Brennan—ordinarily associated with expanding federal
authority—restricted federal court access in Franchise Tax Board v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,32 or why Justice O’Connor—normally
associated with deference to state prerogatives—might have expanded federal

developing students’ autonomous facility with legal materials. This facility includes the students’
ability to see beyond orthodox paradigms for conceiving the case law.
28. For a discussion of ulterior motives and unstated agendas, see infra notes 39–41 and
accompanying text.
29. See Little, supra note 10, at 120–22 (noting that Justices often use the services of
ghostwriter law clerks but still maintain ultimate control of the work product).
30. See id. at 155 (showing how sensitive issues of judicial power may affect the manner in
which opinions are written).
31. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 20 (1964) (observing
that opinion writers may be mindful of avoiding “imprudent judgments” that could “undermine
public faith in the Justices and strengthen interest-group leaders and government officials who
support policies contrary to those of the Court”).
32. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
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court power to review state decisions in Michigan v. Long.33 When the
Supreme Court issued several pro-business, pro-preemption decisions34 during
the October Term of 2007, were nearly all the Justices acting inconsistently
with their usual beliefs? After all, those Justices who generally vote to restrict
federal power voted to expand it through federal preemption, and those
Justices who generally champion the rights of individual citizens voted instead
to protect corporate assets.35
Similarly, if a student offers a characterization of an opinion such as
“liberal” or “conservative,” I inquire about those labels. What is the point of
reference for defining these terms? Does the identity of the opinion’s author
give the opinion that character? Isn’t it possible that the opinion is the product
of significant compromise (and consequent irrationality), which affects how
one should properly understand the opinion? How do we calibrate the
concepts “liberal” and “conservative”? Should economic values, governmental
values, and all other social values be considered? Should we develop a
measure based on the “median Justice”36 for the Supreme Court at fixed points
in time?
To encourage flexibility in students’ conceptions of doctrinal categories, I
offer them hypothetical fact patterns that present several routes for resolution.
In this way, students see that doctrinal boundaries blur and legal problems can
be characterized in myriad directions.37 For example, a hypothetical
presenting a possible Pennhurst38 Eleventh Amendment question might be
disposed of as a supplemental jurisdiction problem, or the state law
complication in the hypothetical might be avoided if the facts are presented as
an invitation to create federal common law.

33. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
34. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (probusiness); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (pro-preemption).
35. See, e.g., Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1000 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito joined the entire majority opinion finding federal preemption
of cardiac patient’s state law tort action against the manufacturer of a balloon catheter); Rowe v.
N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 989, 990 (2008) (Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Breyer, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito joined the majority
opinion finding federal preemption, shielding corporate delivery services from state laws
requiring them to verify buyer’s legal age before delivering goods such as cigarettes).
36. Anna Harvey, What Makes a Judgment “Liberal”? Coding Bias in the United States
Supreme Court Judicial Database 1–2 (Working Paper Presented at the 3rd Annual Conference
on Empirical Legal Studies Papers at Cornell Law School, Sept. 13, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120970 (discussing definitional problems for terms “liberal” and
“conservative” as well as introducing the concept of “liberal judgment”).
37. For further discussion of characterization possibilities, see Laura E. Little,
Characterization and Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372 (1996).
38. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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V. MYSTERY
One must assume that the Justices are not blind to the significant impact of
jurisdictional rulings on the fortunes of litigants and on the development of
substantive law.39 One might also expect that these effects might influence the
result and reasoning in cases. Legions of law review articles and other
scholarly criticism explore and attempt to document ideological and partisan
ulterior motives underlying Federal Courts decisions.40 Yet, as a pedagogical
approach, ceaseless reference to ideological agendas and ulterior motives
unsettles students—leaving them with many seemingly mysterious,
unanswered questions: How do I identify the true motive for a decision?
Should I ignore the stated reason for a decision? Is the common law
methodology of explaining factual distinctions among cases a sham?
Analysis of ideological and partisan motives can thus be disorienting for
the beginning student struggling with a complex web of doctrines.41 Yet
students should consider these matters in order to develop a more subtle
understanding of both the specific cases governing federal jurisdiction as well
as the more general question of whether ideological motivations eliminate the
credibility and legitimacy of legal rules altogether. For this reason, I lead
students into the mysterious territory of motivation, but do so after we are well
into the course, once I get a sense that most students are proficient in
deciphering Federal Courts cases.
To broach the matter of Justices’ motivations, I present the following
questions to students: Why does the ideology popularly known as conservatism
so often get yoked to states’ rights? Why does the ideology popularly known
as liberalism get yoked to federal governmental strength? Is this an accident of
history, or do the ideologies link analytically to a particular preference for one
39. See, e.g., Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of
Acceptable Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 89 (1998) (using terms “naked ideology,” “naked
politics,” and “raw substance” to suggest that “jurisdictional rulings do (and should) often turn on
their direct substantive implications for the litigants and the broader development of substantive
law”).
40. See, e.g., Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 549
(2008) (endorsing the view that in allocating cases between state and federal court, the Supreme
Court is not acting “impartially” and is instead expecting that the allocation decision will
ultimately deny a constitutional guarantee); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal
Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between State and Federal Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211,
1226 (2004) (“[T]here is a very real concern whether jurisdictional outcomes are . . . the product
of naked ideology.”); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 319 n.65 (1984)
(characterizing a traditional Federal Courts course as “the purest of contentless legalist rituals, in
which all ‘policy’ arguments are grounded in funhouse mirror versions of Competence and
Federalism whether they can conceivably be brought to bear on particular cases or not”).
41. See generally Shuell, supra note 26, at 534, 544 (arguing that learning methods and
content should vary according to where students are in the learning process and that premature
introduction of certain matters “may be counterproductive”).
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governmental unit rather than another? For example, do smaller units such as
states more ably accommodate values normally associated with conservatism?
Once we introduce and discuss these questions, I ask the students to read
the remaining cases in the course with these questions in mind. I remind them
of this angle on the material on the final day of the course, admonishing them
to keep the questions in mind as they complete their full review of the course.
My hope is that channeling their inquiry through this particular lens will
encourage them to read the cases closely and empower them to think critically
about the opinions without losing their grounding as they acquire the basic
rules. They can never know what the Justices are truly trying to accomplish,
but the questions provide a way to evaluate the verity of proffered reasoning
and to comprehend profound questions about political structure.
CONCLUSION
Through the five devices of bottom-line practicality, current events,
storytelling, taxonomy, and mystery, I aim to give students a toehold for
understanding and insight into the richness of the material presented in Federal
Courts. Some of the devices trick students into learning. For example, the
advice to focus on the bottom-line effect of a rule allows students to stumble
upon merits-manipulating motives behind jurisdictional principles. Likewise,
the use of emotional hypothetical stories engages students unwittingly in a
process of learning by doing. And urging them to create comforting
taxonomies according to labels such as “conservative” and “liberal” contrives
to introduce them to the contingent nature of categories as well as the
categories’ connection with important political and jurisprudential theories.
The trick, however, is benign. I have found that the five angles on the
material are effective stratagems for steeping students in intricacies of Federal
Courts law and empowering them to assess critically larger issues of legal
process. Federal Courts is an enormously rich subject, with ramifications far
beyond its apparent boundaries. Whatever Federal Courts teachers can do to
keep future lawyers focused on the subject in an expansive, contextualized
sense is an essential contribution to the profession.

